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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
We are asked to decide whether the District Court abused 
its discretion by allowing the prosecution to introduce 
"prior bad acts" evidence during Michael Morley's trial on 
charges of criminal conspiracy, bank fraud, mail fraud and 
wire fraud. Those charges arose from Morley's attestation to 
a forged signature on a fake will. The evidence in question 
pertained to an incident that occurred 14 months prior to 
the events charged in the indictment when Morley asked 
his parents (both of whom were notaries) to notarize 
signatures on bonds that had been signed out of their 
presence. The signatures were forgeries, although the 
government does not contend that Morley knew that when 
he asked his parents to notarize the bonds. Rather, the 
government now contends that the evidence that Morley 
caused his parents to improperly notarize documents was 
relevant to his "intent, knowledge, and absence of mistake 
in signing the fake will of a dead man he had never met." 
Appellee's Br. at 11. We agree that the District Court 
abused its discretion by allowing the prosecution to 
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introduce evidence about the improperly notarized bonds. 
Accordingly, we will vacate the defendant's conviction and 
order that Morley be given a new trial.1  
 
I. 
 
David Thompson died on January 22, 1996, survived by 
three cousins: Raymond, Robert and Kenneth Thompson. 
Shortly after David's death, Robert Thompson contacted 
Robert Morley in order to get advice on the administration 
of David's estate. Morley is a Certified Public Accountant. 
Morley referred Robert to an attorney named Daniel Holmes 
who was Morley's long-time friend and business partner. 
Neither Holmes nor Morley had known David Thompson. 
 
It is unclear whether or not David Thompson actually left 
a will, and no will was found during the ensuing search of 
David's home. Accordingly, Holmes devised a fraudulent 
scheme to create a fake will that would appear to leave the 
entirety of David's estate to Robert and Raymond. Pursuant 
to their agreement with Holmes, Robert and Raymond each 
were to receive one-third of David's estate, and Holmes was 
to receive the remaining third. According to the 
government, Holmes was to split his share with Morley. The 
fake will thus made no provision for Kenneth Thompson. 
Pursuant to that scheme, Holmes drafted a will, forged 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Morley also argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him 
of bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. S 20, that the District Court erred in 
calculating his sentence by not limiting the loss calculation to 2/3 of 
the 
amount due under the missing will, and that the court incorrectly 
calculated the total loss under the Sentencing Guidelines. We hold that 
these arguments are without merit except for his challenge to his 
conviction for bank fraud. 
 
The government concedes that it did not introduce evidence that the 
victim bank was a financial institution as defined in 18 U.S.C. S 20. This 
issue was not raised in the District Court, but the government concedes 
that "there was insufficient evidence presented on this essential element 
and agrees that the conviction on Count Two should be vacated." 
Appellee's Br. at 24. We commend the government for its candor, and we 
agree that the conviction on that count must be vacated. The 
government will be precluded from introducing additional evidence to 
prove this element during the defendant's retrial. 
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David's signature, and then had the defendant and two 
other persons "witness" the forged signature.2 
 
The fake will that Holmes subsequently drafted was later 
admitted to probate in Camden County, New Jersey. 
Thereafter, Holmes and Raymond Thompson took control of 
David's estate. They established an account under the 
name "Estate of David L. Thompson," and consolidated and 
liquidated estate assets. 
 
At trial, the government presented evidence that Morley 
received substantial sums from the estate account.3 Morley 
also arranged for a $100,000 loan from the estate to C&H 
Drilling, a new business venture of one of Morley's clients. 
The loan repayments were then directed to Morley who kept 
some of the proceeds, and distributed the balance to 
Raymond and Robert Thompson.4 
 
In June of 1996 the FBI interviewed Morley in connection 
with its investigation into the fraudulent bank transactions. 
During that interview Morley admitted that he had signed 
the attestation on a document as requested by Holmes. 
However, Morley insisted that he assumed the signature he 
was attesting to was genuine because Holmes and another 
business associate had already witnessed it. Thereafter, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The precise order of these events is not clear. The government argues 
that Morley was present for discussions about creating the fraudulent 
will, but Morley denies that. He insists that, although he signed the will 
as a witness to David Thompson's signature, he did not know that 
David's signature was forged. Robert and Raymond Thompson testified 
during trial that Morley was present when they discussed fabricating 
David's will. However, it does appear that Morley and Holmes had an 
agreement by which they would share one-third of the estate. A letter 
from Morley to Holmes dated May 22, 1996 stated:"Please let me know 
where I stand in relation to this because my portion of an Estate valued 
at $2,021,000 would equal $336,833.33. That is a substantial sum and 
the payments thereof needs [sic] to be documented." (Appellee's 
Supplemental Appendix ("Supp. App.") at 259a-261a). 
 
3. The evidence showed that Morley received (1) $120,000 in the form of 
a cashier's check on February 9, 1996, (2) $150,000 on February 21, 
1996, (3) $5,000 on March 5, 1996, (4) $17,000 on March 19, 1996 (for 
"services to the estate," although Morley later admitted at trial that he 
did not render any services to the estate). 
 
4. C&H Drilling later defaulted on the loan. 
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Morley, Holmes, Raymond and Robert were all indicted on 
various charges arising from the fraudulent scheme. 
Holmes, Raymond and Robert pled guilty and cooperated 
with the government in the prosecution of Morley.5 
 
Prior to Morley's trial, the government informed Morley 
that it intended to introduce evidence that 14 months prior 
to David's death, Holmes had asked Morley to have his 
parents notarize approximately 100 savings bonds 
purportedly signed by Joseph DiStefano (the rightful 
owner), and that Morley had done so. The government 
would establish that Morley's parents had notarized the 
bonds as Morley requested, however, DiStefano's signature 
had actually been forged by Holmes. Morley filed a motion 
in limine to preclude the government from introducing this 
evidence. 
 
The government filed a "Response to Defendant's Motion 
to Preclude Proffered Evidence" in which it argued that the 
evidence was admissible "pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) 
to prove the defendant's motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, planning, knowledge and absence of mistake." 
The government also stated that "[e]vidence that the 
defendant obtained the notarization of over 100 U.S. 
Savings Bonds. . . when the signatory was neither known 
nor present is proper to show the defendant's knowledge, 
intent, plan and modus operandi of falsely witnessing the 
will of a dead man, who was neither known nor present." 
The government did not then, nor does it now, argue that 
the defendant knew that the signatures on the bonds were 
forgeries, or that it was the defendant who actually 
notarized the bonds. 
 
The District Court denied the defense motion to exclude 
the evidence and the matter proceeded to trial where Morley 
took the witness stand and denied knowingly engaging in a 
fraudulent scheme. Morley did not deny signing the fake 
will as a witness, rather he insisted that he had done so 
believing that the purported signature was genuine. 
 
On cross examination, the Assistant United States 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Both Raymond and Robert testified against the defendant at trial, 
however Holmes was not called as a witness. 
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Attorney inquired into the incident regarding the notarized 
bonds. The government was able to establish that 14 
months before Holmes forged Thompson's will, Holmes had 
asked Morley to get his parents to notarize the 
aforementioned U.S. Savings Bonds, and that Morley had 
agreed to do so in return for $5.00 per bond. The 
government's evidence also showed that the signatures on 
those bonds were forged. In closing argument, the Assistant 
United States Attorney referred to the prior incident as 
follows: 
 
       And here's the big CPA who gets over a hundred bonds, 
       two times in a one-month period, and what's he do? He 
       puts his parents at risk. He asks his parents to do 
       something he knows is wrong. . . . And Michael Morley 
       puts his parents in jeopardy and has them falsely 
       witness the savings bonds. He doesn't want to take the 
       big risk then, he wants his parents to do it. 
 
(Appendix ("App.") at 142a-143a). In addition, despite the 
fact that the government failed to introduce any evidence 
tending to show that Morley knew the bonds had been 
forged, the Assistant United States Attorney argued in 
closing that the bond evidence should cause the jury to 
conclude that Morley knew the signing of the will was part 
of a fraudulent scheme: 
 
       Why does he allow Dan Holmes to bring him a will and 
       ask him to sign it when he knows it's illegal, he knows 
       it's wrong, he knows it's criminal. Why does he do it? 
       Well, Dan Holmes had done this before. And he saw 
       Dan Holmes do this before and he worked with Dan 
       Holmes doing this before and he only got a little bit of 
       money when Dan Holmes did it before and he saw Dan 
       Holmes get a lot of money when he did it before and 
       maybe it could work again. So if you could just go 
       along with it and keep his hands off of it as much as 
       possible, maybe he could ride the coattails of Dan 
       [Holmes]. 
 
(Supp. App. at 347a) (emphasis added). 
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Morley was convicted of all charges, and this appeal  
followed.6 
 
II. 
 
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) provides: 
 
       Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 
       admissible to prove the character of a person in order 
       to show action in conformity therewith. It may, 
       however, be admissible for other purposes, such as 
       proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
       knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident 
       . . . . 
 
However, in order for such evidence to be admissible under 
Rule 404(b), its probative value must outweigh the 
prejudice inherent in testimony about a defendant's prior 
"bad acts," Fed. R. Evid. 403. The trial court must inform 
the jurors of the limited use they may make of such 
evidence, and also instruct them not to draw any inference 
of bad character from it. Huddleston v. United States, 485 
U.S. 681, 691-92 (1988). 
 
Evidence admitted under Rule 404(b), like all other 
evidence, must be relevant to some proper purpose. 
"Evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b) only if it is 
relevant." Id. at 689. Evidence is relevant if it has "any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence . . . more probable or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 401. Here, as 
in so many cases, inquiries of relevance and proper 
purpose are intimately intertwined. Evidence that is not 
relevant, by definition, cannot be offered for a proper 
purpose, and evidence that may be relevant for some 
purposes may be irrelevant for the purpose for which it is 
offered. Moreover, there is no alchemistic formula by which 
"bad act" evidence that is not relevant for a proper purpose 
under Rule 404(b) is transformed into admissible evidence. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. We exercise appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. We 
review a trial judge's decision to admit evidence of uncharged offenses 
for abuse of discretion. United States v. Traitz, 871 F.2d 368, 389 (3d 
Cir. 1989). 
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Thus, a proponent's incantation of the proper uses of such 
evidence under the rule does not magically transform 
inadmissible evidence into admissible evidence."Relevance 
is not an inherent characteristic," Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 
689, "nor are prior bad acts intrinsically relevant to `motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 
or absence of mistake.' " United States v. Sampson, 980 
F.2d 883, 888 (3d Cir. 1992). Thus, when prior bad act 
evidence is both relevant and admissible for a proper 
purpose, "the proponent must clearly articulate how that 
evidence fits into a chain of logical inferences, no link of 
which may be the inference that the defendant has the 
propensity to commit the crime charged." United States v. 
Himelwright, 42 F.3d 777, 782; United States v. Jemal, 26 
F.3d 1267 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
Here, the government asserts that the challenged 
evidence was relevant to Morley's "knowledge and intent at 
the time Holmes asked him to sign the will as a`third 
witness.' " Appellee's Br. at 17. This refrain is repeated 
throughout the government's brief.7 Yet, upon close 
examination, the only connection between Morley's request 
to his parents to notarize the bonds, and his alleged 
attestation on the forged will is the inference that Morley 
was likely to have been guilty of the latter merely because 
he had previously engaged in "similar" impropriety. This is 
the very evil that Rule 404(b) seeks to prevent. Evidence 
pertaining to the notarized bonds is simply not relevant to 
whether Morley knew the signature on Thompson's will was 
forged absent the natural (and improper) inference that 
lurks beneath the surface of the government's use of this 
evidence. At trial the prosecution did not even attempt to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The government argues: "Morley placed his knowledge and intent at 
issue by denying his involvement in the conspiracy .. . ." Appellee's Br. 
at 18. "The key element of his involvement in the conspiracy was his 
witness signature on the will of a dead man he never met." Id. "Evidence 
of the same two individuals (Holmes and Morley) participating together 
to obtain false notarization of the signature of another person on U.S. 
Savings Bonds is highly relevant to show the knowing and intentional 
behavior of Morley in this case." Id. at 19. 
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establish that Morley knew the signature on the bonds was 
forged.8 
 
At oral argument before us, the government was 
represented by an Assistant United States Attorney who 
had not tried the case, and he had the unenviable task of 
defending the trial prosecutor's closing argument, and the 
hodgepodge of explanations the government had offered for 
the Rule 404(b) evidence. Although he valiantly attempted 
to do so, his attempts to justify the government's conduct 
were unsuccessful. When we asked for an articulation of a 
proper purpose for this evidence at argument, the 
government responded: 
 
       The evidence was offered to show Mr. Morley's criminal 
       knowledge and criminal intent in engaging in a scheme 
       with Mr. Holmes regarding the fake will. The evidence 
       specifically was that he had gotten his parents to 
       falsely notarize documents that attest the signatures 
       were authentic, made by people in front of them, and 
       that was not actually the case. And this was probative 
       of the fact that Mr. Morley had dealt before with Mr. 
       Holmes knowingly and intentionally in obtaining false 
       signatures on documents, a material issue that had to 
       proved with respect to the fake will. 
 
Transcript of Oral Arguments at 19-20. We then asked: "Q: 
What is the relevance of what happened in the bond issue 
to whether on this occasion, sixteen months later . . . he 
signed the will knowing that the testator wasn't present?" 
Id. at 23. The government responded: 
 
       The relevance is that he previously knowingly agreed to 
       help his friend, Mr. Holmes, obtain false notary seals 
       on documents attesting that these signatures were 
       placed on the documents by the people whose names 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. We do not mean to suggest that the evidence would necessarily have 
been proper if the government had shown that Morley knew the 
signature on the bonds was a forgery. We do suggest, however, that the 
government's failure to establish that guilty knowledge further 
undermines the government's assertion that the prior conduct was 
relevant to Morley's intent in attesting to the forged signature on the 
fake 
will. 
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       appeared there when that was not true. . . . [I]t's a 
       fraudulent act by itself to place those fraudulent seals.9 
 
Id. at 23-24. We then asked if the government's explanation 
was merely an assertion that the evidence of Morley's prior 
bad acts simply established that he was someone of bad 
character who was, therefore, more likely to have knowingly 
engaged in the fraudulent will scheme with Holmes. We 
asked: "And because he's the kind of guy who had done it 
before, he's the kind of guy who will do it again[?]" Id. at 
24-25. The Assistant United States Attorney responded: 
"Right." Id. at 25. That refreshingly candid response is the 
best (and we think the only) explanation of why this 
evidence was offered in the first place. However, we sought 
further clarification. We asked: "Why else is it relevant, 
other than he did it once before, he's the kind of guy that 
will do it again?" Id. The government responded: 
 
       It's not to show that he did it before, he'll do it again. 
       It's to show that he had the prior knowledge of Holmes 
       and what Holmes was doing. He engaged previously 
       with the same intent. 
 
Id. However, that argument assumes that Morley knew that 
the bonds were forged when he took them to his parents. 
The prosecution could have called Holmes (who was 
apparently cooperating pursuant to his plea agreement) to 
attempt to establish that Morley was told that the 
signatures on the bonds were forgeries when Morley took 
them to his parents, but it made no effort to do so. 
Ironically, after now suggesting that Morley knew the 
signatures on the bonds were forged, the government 
asserts in its brief that Morley's belief as to the genuineness 
of the signatures on the bonds was irrelevant, and there 
was therefore no need to call Holmes during Morley's trial. 
The government states, "Despite Morley's complaint about 
Holmes' absence at trial, there was no need for Holmes to 
testify about matters not in dispute." Appellee's Br. at 18, 
n. 5. 
 
During our exchange at oral argument, the government 
shifted gears. It seized upon Morley's trial testimony that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Morley's parents, not Morley, placed the seals on the bonds. 
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the signature on the attestation looked like his, but that he 
did not remember signing it. The government used that 
testimony to argue that the evidence regarding the bonds 
was relevant because it showed Morley signed David 
Thompson's will as a witness. We then asked the 
government to explain that connection. 
 
       [By the court]: To the extent that[the evidence] comes 
       in to impeach [Morley] when he says that it looks like 
       my signature . . . I don't recall signing this, you are 
       saying that you used a prior document, fourteen 
       months earlier that he did not sign, that he gave to his 
       parents to show that he signed this document? 
 
       A: That's correct. 
 
Transcript of Oral Arguments at 33-34. That explanation is 
illogical. Moreover, Morley never denied attesting to the 
purported signature on Thompson's will. As noted above, he 
admitted that to the FBI when he was first interviewed 
about the scheme to probate a fraudulent will. In its brief 
on appeal, the government concedes that "Morley admitted 
that he signed the will . . . Yet Morley denied knowledge or 
intent that he agreed to witness a fake will and loot the 
decedent's estate." Appellee's Br. at 15. Furthermore, even 
if Morley had denied attesting to the testator's signature, we 
fail to see how evidence of the prior notarization of bonds 
would have made it more likely than not that Morley signed 
the will, absent an improper inference of bad character. 
 
Our concern is only heightened by the explanation the 
government initially gave in response to defense counsel's 
motion in limine to exclude this evidence. There, as noted 
above, the government argued that the evidence was 
admissible "to prove the defendant's motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, planning, knowledge and absence of 
mistake." It also argued that the evidence was relevant "to 
show the defendant's knowledge, intent, plan and modus 
operandi of falsely witnessing the will of a dead man, who 
was neither known nor present." It said nothing about 
handwriting, or establishing that defendant's handwriting 
was on the will. 
 
The government further strains to justify its resort to the 
prior misconduct by suggesting that it was relevant to show 
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the relationship between Holmes and Morley, and bore 
upon Morley's behavior in forging the attestation on 
Thompson's will. We are told that "[e]vidence of the same 
two individuals . . . participating together to obtain false 
notarization of the signature of another person on U.S. 
Savings Bonds is highly relevant to show the knowing and 
intentional behavior of Morley in this case." Appellee's Br. 
at 19. However, this evidence was not necessary to tie 
Morley to Holmes. That was a given from the very 
beginning. The government's own brief describes Holmes as 
Morley's "long-time friend and business partner." Appellee's 
Br. at 3. In Sampson, we reversed a conviction where the 
government used evidence of prior illegal drug transactions 
involving the defendant and his wife as part of the 
circumstances from which the jury could infer that 
defendant knew that certain drugs were in his prison cell, 
and that his wife was the individual who had smuggled 
them in to him. We rejected that argument because the 
evidence actually served to establish criminal propensities 
of the defendant; and to the extent it was relevant, the 
district court had erred in failing to conduct a balancing 
test under Rule 403. 
 
Similarly, in United States v. Hans, 738 F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 
1984), we rejected the government's attempt to introduce 
evidence of defendant's record for bank robberies. There, 
the government first tried to link the defendant to an 
individual named "Bauman" and then had an agent explain 
that the focus on Bauman led to the defendant. We stated: 
"[T]he government had no need to introduce[the evidence] 
to show that Bauman and [the defendant] knew each other. 
The prosecution had already established that. . .[the 
agent's] testimony was therefore cumulative, and 
excludable on that ground as well." Id. at 94. Simply put, 
the government can not create an issue where none exists 
and then rely upon Rule 404(b) to argue that prior 
misconduct is relevant to the manufactured issue. 
 
Here, the parade of ephemeral explanations marched on 
as we continued to press for clarification as to why this 
evidence was relevant. The government argued: 
 
       [T]his same man earlier, Mr. Holmes, came to Mr. 
       Morley and asked him to help in getting false notary 
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       seals placed on a document, that it makes it more 
       likely than not that Mr. Morley had knowledge of what 
       Holmes was up to when Holmes then asked him later 
       to put his signature on another document which turns 
       out to be another false statement. Just as false as 
       those notary representations were, they were similarly 
       false, that Mr. Morley was sitting there witnessing the 
       act of David Thompson, which was a false statement. 
       But there's a very clear inference that we submit that 
       can be drawn and that we asked the jury to draw. 
 
Transcript of Oral Arguments at 34-35. 
 
We believe the situation here is analogous to, though not 
as egregious as (and perhaps not as clear as) United States 
v. Mothershed, 859 F.2d 585, 589 (8th Cir. 1988). There, 
the court was concerned about evidence of defendant's 
prior conviction for possessing stolen bank money. That 
prior conviction had been introduced at defendant's trial for 
bank robbery 10 years later. The defendant admitted to 
having been in the bank the day of the robbery, and 
admitted to having a large sum of cash, but testified that 
he did not rob the bank, and that he won the cash 
gambling at a party before the time of the robbery. The 
government argued that evidence that the defendant had 
previously been convicted for possessing stolen bank money 
was admissible under Rule 404(b) to prove "opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, and absence 
of mistake." Id. at 587. However, the Court of Appeals was 
not impressed with the prosecution's recitation of the litany 
of legitimate purposes under Rule 404(b). The courtfirst 
noted that it had "not been aided in [its] review by the 
`laundry list' approach taken at trial. Rather than name the 
particular issue for which this conviction was relevant, it 
appears that the government simply read the justifications 
contained in Rule 404(b)." Id. at 588. The court then noted 
that such an approach was not, by itself, reason to exclude 
such evidence or to reverse the defendant's conviction, but 
that "it is a practice we discourage." Id . We agree. 
 
In rejecting the prosecution's attempt to legitimize the 
prior bad act evidence in Mothershed, the court explained: 
 
       We cannot conclude that the prior conviction is 
       relevant to any of these issues. There is only one sense 
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       in which we regard that conviction as relevant: it is 
       reasonable to conclude that a person who has been 
       convicted of possessing money that he knows was 
       stolen from a bank is more likely to be a bank robber 
       than are most other people who have no such record. 
       But this is simply an observation about a person's 
       character, and as such, is precisely the kind of 
       evidence that Rule 404(b) is designed to exclude. We do 
       not convict people of crimes simply because of their 
       propensities; we do so because of what they have 
       actually done. 
 
Id. at 589. 
 
Neither a trial court nor an appellate court is comforted 
when a proponent attempts to justify "bad act" evidence by 
resorting to a mantra-like recitation of the provisions of 
Rule 404(b). Accordingly, as we noted above, we require the 
prosecution to "clearly articulate how that evidence fits into 
a chain of logical inferences, no link of which can be the 
inference that because the defendant committed . . . 
offenses before, he therefore is more likely to have 
committed this one." Sampson, 980 F.2d at 887. "The 
government must therefore proffer a logical chain of 
inference consistent with its theory of the case," Id. at 888, 
and when it does so, "[t]he district court must put a chain 
of inferences into the record, none of which is the inference 
that the defendant has a propensity to commit this crime." 
Id. 
 
Here, despite the government's protestations to the 
contrary, evidence of Morley's prior involvement with the 
improperly notarized bonds is relevant only to show that 
Morley has certain criminal "propensities," and it is 
therefore more likely that he knew the signature of the 
testator on the fake will had been forged. "[W]hile the 
government's argument was cloaked in terms of [Morley's] 
intent, the goal here was actually something different; it 
was to portray [Morley] as a person who" was more likely 
than not guilty of the charged crimes because he had done 
something that was illegal in the past. Himelwright, 42 F.3d 
at 783. The nexus between the conduct Morley was indicted 
for, and his prior bad acts is even more tenuous because 
there is no evidence he knew the signatures on the bonds 
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had been forged, he merely presented the signed bonds to 
his parents and asked them to notarize the signatures as 
though the bonds had been signed in their presence. 
Though Morley's conduct with regard to the bonds was 
clearly wrong, we do not think that it takes on the 
significance the prosecution seeks to attribute to it.10 
 
When all is said and done, the closing argument of the 
Assistant United States Attorney who tried this case 
provides a far more lucid explanation for why this evidence 
was admitted than the elusive justifications that the 
government has parroted from the rule. As noted above, in 
closing, the prosecutor argued: 
 
       And here's the big CPA who gets over a hundred bonds, 
       two times in a one-month period, and what's he do? He 
       puts his parents at risk. He asks his parents to do 
       something he knows is wrong. . . . And Michael Morley 
       puts his parents in jeopardy and has them falsely 
       witness the savings bonds. He doesn't want to take the 
       big risk then, he wants his parents to do it. . . . 
 
App. at 142a-143a. This frontal assault upon the 
defendant's character is simply not appropriate under our 
system of laws, and the trial court abused its discretion in 
admitting it.11 Despite the government's various 
explanations, we do not think evidence of the notarization 
of the bonds is probative of Morley's intent in signing the 
fake will, absent the improper inference of bad character. 
 
The government cites several cases to support its 
assertion that the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in admitting this evidence.12  However, we are not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. In Commonwealth v. Downing, 357 A.2d 703, 704 (Pa Cmwlth, 1976), 
the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania stated: "[w]e suspect that it is 
all too common a practice for notaries public to affix their seals to 
documents not signed in their presence." Though the practice is wrong, 
and can not be condoned, we doubt it is any less common in New Jersey 
where Morley was tried than it was in Pennsylvania when the 
Commonwealth Court made its observation. 
 
11. Defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor's closing. 
Nevertheless, we believe the initial objection to introducing this 
evidence 
is sufficient to preserve this issue on appeal. 
 
12. See Appellee's Br. at 13-14. 
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persuaded. In United States v. Wood, 982 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 
1991), the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed 
the trial court's admission of testimony that the defendant 
had previously falsely notarized documents, and signed 
other persons' names to legal documents. The defendant 
was an attorney who was on trial for conspiracy to obtain 
forged signatures on various deeds for a friend. The trial 
court allowed former members of the defendant's office staff 
to testify that he had previously signed other persons' 
names to documents and notarized documents that had not 
been signed in his presence. During the trial, the defendant 
had denied fraudulent intent in forging the deeds in 
question. He insisted that he had obtained the signatures 
only as an accommodation, and that he had never before 
signed anyone else's name to a legal document, nor falsely 
notarized any documents. Accordingly, the court of appeals 
ruled that the challenged testimony of his former staff was 
properly admitted under Rule 404(b) to impeach the 
defendant's own testimony. "Appellant testified that his 
effort to procure unauthorized signatures was a`one time 
occurrence.' The proffered evidence thus directly 
contradicted the testimony of appellant himself. It was also 
highly relevant on the issue of appellant's intent and thus 
admissible under Rule 404(b)." Id. at 4. 13 
 
In United States v. Faust, 850 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1998), 
the defendant was convicted of forgery and embezzlement. 
During his trial, the prosecution introduced letters that 
defendant had previously fraudulently altered. The trial 
court allowed the testimony because it concluded that the 
prior bad acts were "clearly relevant to [the defendant's] 
state of mind and contradicted his professions of good faith 
or mistake." Id. at 583. However, the court did so with no 
analysis, and with no discussion of why the inferences 
arising from the prior bad acts were consistent with the 
requirements of Rule 404(b). Id. at 583. The Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed with little discussion 
other than stating its belief that the prior bad acts were 
relevant to defendant's good faith in connection with the 
charged offenses. Our jurisprudence requires more. See 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. We do not mean to infer that evidence of prior forgeries, by itself, 
is 
admissible to establish intent under Rule 404(b). 
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Sampson, supra. Here, neither the government, nor the trial 
court complied with the procedure that we set forth in 
Sampson, and that we reiterate above. Accordingly, Faust 
provides little support for the prosecution's position. 
 
In United States v. Weiler, 385 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1967),14 
the defendant was convicted of wilfully making false 
statements in an application for a license under the Federal 
Firearms Act. He signed an application for a firearms 
license in which he swore that he had not previously been 
convicted of a felony. At trial, the prosecution was allowed 
to introduce evidence that the defendant had previously 
been convicted of assault and battery, and the court 
instructed the jury that the conviction subjected the 
defendant to a period of imprisonment in excess of one 
year. The defendant's criminal history was, of course, an 
element of the offense and, therefore, admissible. However, 
the prosecution also introduced evidence that the defendant 
lied about his address to a government investigator, and 
that he had made false material misrepresentations on an 
application to the Department of Defense pertaining to his 
son's miliary service. We concluded that the testimony 
regarding defendant's false statements about his address 
was not admissible. Id. at 68 ("We find that it was not 
sufficiently probative of `willfulness' to be admitted on that 
issue."). We did not rule upon the admissibility of 
defendant's prior false declarations on the Department of 
Defense form. Rather, we concluded that it was sufficiently 
similar to the charged offense to be "controlled by the 
sound discretion rule," and we left the determination as to 
the admissibility of that evidence to the discretion of the 
trial court on remand for a new trial. Id. 
 
In United States v. Allen, 76 F.3d 1348 (5th Cir. 1996), 
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial 
court's admission of evidence of prior fraudulent acts in 
defendant's trial for various charges related to a charged 
bank fraud. The court reasoned that evidence of 
defendant's forgeries involving repayment of a $1,600,000 
loan was part of the scheme for which he was indicted and 
therefore not "bad acts" evidence at all. Id. at 1364; ("The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Weiler was obviously decided before Sampson. 
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forgeries were the very fraud charged in count ten, and 
thus . . . not prior bad acts within the meaning of Rule 
404(b)"). Evidence of additional forgeries was properly 
admitted because of the uniqueness of those prior bad acts. 
The court stated: "We hold that `the circumstances of the 
extraneous act were so similar to the offense in question 
that they evince[d] a signature quality -- marking the 
extraneous act as the handiwork of the accused.' " Allen, 76 
F.3d at 1364, citing United States v. Sanchez, 988 F.2d 
1384, 1393 (5th Cir. 1993) (alteration added, internal 
quotation marks omitted). Conduct involving the bonds at 
issue here clearly does not rise to the level of a "signature 
crime." The court in Allen also allowed other evidence of 
uncharged forgeries that "showed motive." Id. at 1365-66. 
Still other bad act evidence was not subjected to a Rule 
404(b) inquiry because the objection went to the 
prosecution's closing, ("his challenge is to argument, not 
evidence, and [the defendant] himself introduced the 
underlying evidence."), or because defense counsel never 
objected and the prior bad act evidence did not amount to 
plain error. Id. at 1366 ("we review only for plain error and 
we find none."). 
 
Thus, none of these cases support the government's 
position here. The government quite properly reminds us 
that we have stated "that Rule 404(b) is a rule of `inclusion' 
rather than `exclusion.' " Appellee's Br. at 12 (citing United 
States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015, 1019, and Sampson, 
supra). However, our recognition of the proper operation of 
a rule of evidence can neither obliterate the rule, nor be 
seized upon to circumvent the rule's requirements. This is 
particularly true when we consider the obvious dangers 
inherent in evidence of uncharged bad acts, and the 
adversarial tendency of the proponents of such evidence to 
be less than candid about their motives for offering 
evidence that suggests that a defendant's character is 
suspect. See Sampson, 980 F.2d at 886 ("Although the 
government will hardly admit it, the reasons proffered to 
admit prior bad act evidence . . . is often mixed between an 
urge to show some other consequential fact as well as to 
impugn the defendant's character"). 
 
The fact that Rule 404(b) operates as a rule of inclusion 
as opposed to operating as a rule of exclusion does not 
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open the flood gates to evidence that is relevant only to 
establish a defendant's bad character. Thus, we require 
that such evidence meet the "chain of inference" test set 
forth in Sampson. See also Himelwright, 42 F.3d at 781-82 
(reversing a conviction where the government used 404(b) 
evidence in closing argument to portray the criminal 
propensity of the accused), Jemal, 26 F.3d at 1272, and 
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Harris, 938 F.2d 401, 
419 (3d Cir. 1991). This is not a difficult burden to 
overcome when the evidence truly is relevant to a proper 
purpose. 
 
We realize that the District Court did give a cautionary 
instruction here. In its final charge, the court instructed: 
 
       [Y]ou've heard evidence of . . . the alleged act of the 
       defendant obtaining notary seals on bonds of . . . Mr. 
       DeStefano. There are no charges pending in this case 
       with respect to that. You must not consider any of that 
       evidence in deciding if the defendant committed the 
       acts charged in the indictment. 
 
       However, you may consider this evidence for other 
       very limited purposes. If you find beyond a reasonable 
       doubt from other evidence in this case that the 
       defendant did commit the acts charged in the 
       indictment, then you may consider evidence of similar 
       alleged conduct on another occasion. . . to determine 
       whether the defendant had the state of mind or intent 
       necessary to commit the crime or crimes charged in the 
       present indictment. . . . 
 
       [Y]ou are only permitted to use that other conduct to 
       show his intent . . . in the present indictment. They are 
       not permitted to show that he is - his general 
       character. That would be an improper use of that 
       evidence. 
 
Supp. App. at 371a-72a. However, as noted above, the 
evidence here only tends to establish the defendant's state 
of mind in witnessing the will if one views the defendant 
with the jaundiced vision resulting from the prior 
misconduct, and the fact that he put his parents at risk. 
We can find no relevance beyond that improper inference, 
and the government has not shown us any. Thus, the 
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court's charge can not cure the danger inherent in the 
testimony about the bonds. "Where the government has not 
clearly articulated reasons why the evidence is relevant to 
any legitimate purpose, there is no realistic basis to believe 
that the jury will cull the proper inferences and material 
facts from the evidence." Sampson, 980 F.2d at 889. Here, 
of course, there is no way to limit the government to its 
clearly articulated theory because no theory was clearly 
articulated, and the evidence was not relevant to any of the 
theories that the government did toss against the 
evidentiary wall of Rule 404(b). 
 
III. 
 
We note that, although the government did produce 
circumstantial evidence from which the jury could infer 
that Morley knew that the will was a forgery, we do not 
believe that evidence was so compelling, nor the 
prosecution's transgression so inconsequential, that we can 
conclude that admission of Morley's prior impropriety was 
harmless error. Accordingly, we will vacate the defendant's 
conviction, and remand the matter to the District Court for 
a new trial consistent with this opinion. 
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